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Abstract 
This housing market matching model considers two types of home seekers: people who 
search for a house both in the rental and in the homeownership market, and people who 
only search in the homeownership market. The house-search process leads to several types 
of matching and in turn this implies different prices of equilibrium. Also, the house-search 
process connects the rental market with the homeownership market. This model is thus able 
to explain both the relationship between the rental price and the selling price and the price 
dispersion which exists in the housing market. Furthermore, this theoretical model can be 
used to study the impact of taxation in the two markets. Precisely, it is straightforward to 
show the effects of two different taxes: the tax on property sale and the tax on rental 
income. 
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1. Introduction 
Although recent, housing market studies that adopt search and matching models are not 
new in the economic literature (notably, Wheaton, 1990; Krainer, 2001; Albrecht et al., 
2007; Caplin and Leahy, 2008; Novy-Marx, 2009; Ngai and Tenreyro, 2009; Diaz and Jerez, 
2009; Albrecht et al., 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung 
and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012). Precisely, two goals are usually pursued: analysing the 
formation process of house price in a decentralised market with search and matching 
frictions; explaining the behaviour of the housing market, in particular the price dispersion 
and the relationship among prices, time-on-the-market and sales. 
The empirical “anomaly” known as ‘price dispersion’ is probably the most important 
distinctive feature of housing markets (see e.g. Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). It refers to 
the phenomenon of selling two houses with very similar attributes and in near locations at 
the same time but at very different prices. The literature has mainly responded to the price 
dispersion puzzle by introducing the heterogeneity of economic agents.
1
 In Leung and Zhang 
(2011), in fact, a necessary condition for explaining the housing price dispersion, as well as 
the relationship among prices, time-on-the-market and sales, is the heterogeneity on the 
seller's and/or the buyer's side which generates corresponding submarkets. 
Nevertheless, price dispersion may arise from the different states of home seekers in 
the search process. The basic idea behind the paper is the following: when a household or 
person needs to change its home (for business reasons or family needs), the goal is to buy a 
new or better house. However, the tenant state is often a satisfactory temporary situation, 
an intermediate step before buying in the homeownership market. In short, in the model the 
tenant state is modelled as a staging post for searching in the homeownership market. 
Nevertheless, some home-seekers can immediately find a home in the homeownership 
market. As a result, in this model there are two types of home seekers: the tenants who are 
waiting to become owners of a dwelling, thus searching only in the homeownership market, 
and people who search for a dwelling both in the rental and in the homeownership market 
(we simply refer to the latter as “seekers”). Hence, the search process leads to several types 
of matching; in turn, this implies different prices of equilibrium. Also, the search process 
connects the rental market with the homeownership market. Indeed, this paper analyses the 
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 Obviously, house price dispersion may also be due to missing housing characteristics (not observable or 
difficult to measure), the so-called unobserved good heterogeneity. 
 2 
situation when both the homeownership market and the rental market are subject to search 
and matching frictions. As far as we are aware, this topic has been overlooked by housing 
market studies which adopt search and matching models. Indeed, papers in this literature 
omit the rental housing market from consideration (Diaz and Jerez, 2009) or rely on the 
standard asset-market equilibrium condition (Ngai and Tenreyro, 2009),
2
 thus assuming a 
rental market without frictions (Kashiwagi, 2011).
3
 
Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to develop a search and matching model of 
the housing market which is able to explain both the price dispersion and the relationship 
between rental and selling prices, relying only on the different states of home seekers in the 
search process. Furthermore, the proposed theoretical model can be used to study the 
impact of taxation in the housing market. Precisely, we consider the effects of two different 
taxes: the tax on property sale and the tax on rental income. We find that the tax on 
property sale increases the selling price and reduces the rental price; whereas, the tax on 
rental income increases both the rental price and the selling price, thus also increasing the 
time-on-the-market in both markets. Thus, a property sale tax may be better than a rental 
income tax. However, in the model there is the distinction between sellers and landlords, 
and thus further and potential effects of taxation on house prices are not considered. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the housing market 
matching model; section 3 shows the existence of price dispersion and describes the 
equilibrium of the model where the relationship between selling price and rental price play a 
key role; while section 4 discusses some effects of taxation on house prices and time-on-the-
market; finally, section 5 concludes the work. 
 
2. The housing market matching model 
The housing market consists of the rental market and the homeownership market. In the 
homeownership market, the home-seeker who finds a dwelling and pays the selling price 
becomes the (new) owner of the house; whereas, this does not happen in the rental market, 
where the rental price only ensures the use of the house for a certain period of time. We 
                                                 
2
 Assuming perfectly competitive housing markets, in equilibrium the risk-adjusted returns for homeowners 
and landlords should be equated across investments. This yields the usual user cost formula à la Poterba (1984) 
where the rental price covers the user cost of housing, which is equal to the house price multiplied by the user 
cost, i.e. the sum of the real after-tax interest rate, the combined depreciation and maintenance rate, and the 
expected future house price appreciation. 
3
 Well-functioning rental markets can smooth out fluctuations in housing market liquidity (Krainer, 2001). 
 3 
distinguish these two (sub-)markets by the subscript { }SR,i = , where R = rental market and 
S = homeownership or sale market. Hence, Rp  is the rental price and Sp  is the selling price. 
There are two main categories of home seekers in this housing market matching model: 
people who search for a dwelling both in the rental and in the homeownership market, 
simply named “seekers” ( h ), and people who pay a rent, thus searching only in the 
homeownership market, named “tenants” ( Sh ). We assume that the mass of 
households/persons who need to change their home (for business reasons or family needs) 
increases over time and all the “new” home-seekers λ  (where λ  is a positive and exogenous 
number) initially search on both markets, i.e. they enter the seekers pool ( h ). As regards the 
supply side, i.e. the housing offer, there is free entry into the market. Hence, it is the free 
entry condition which allows the equilibrium value of vacant houses to be determined. In 
short, new vacant houses will be posted until the value of a further vacancy becomes equal 
to zero. In equilibrium, in fact, all the profit opportunities derived from opening new 
vacancies have been exploited, therefore the value of an additional vacancy is equal to zero 
(see Pissarides, 2000).
4
 Precisely, in this model, sellers post vacancies in the homeownership 
market and landlords open vacancies in the rental market.
5
 Hence, landlords only meet with 
the seekers ( h ). 
In order to formalise the housing market, we adopt a standard matching framework à 
la Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000) with random search and prices 
determined by Nash bargaining. The housing market is a “matching market” like the labour 
market, that clears not only through price, but also through time and money that the parties 
spend on the market. Thus, the search and matching approach is arguably more appropriate 
also for this type of market. As is usual in matching-type models (see Pissarides, 2000; 
Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), the meeting of vacant houses and home seekers is 
regulated by an aggregate matching function, m: 
( )h,vmm RR = ; ( )( )SSS hh,vmm +=  
where Rv  and Sv  are the number of vacancies in the rental market and in the 
homeownership market, respectively. Precisely, the matching function gives the number of 
                                                 
4
 The zero-profit (or free-entry) condition makes sense in the housing market if houses (in both sub-markets) 
are supplied by competitive house builders, in addition to being supplied by owners who no longer need them 
for occupation. 
5
 The distinction between sellers and landlords is obviously a simplification of the model, since the sellers can 
rent their house and landlords can sell their house. Matters thus become simpler without loss of generality. 
 4 
matches (i.e. contracts) formed per unit of time, given the number of vacant houses and the 
share of home seekers in the market. Recall that both the seekers ( h ) and the tenants ( Sh ) 
search in the homeownership market. The matching function is non-negative, increasing and 
concave in both arguments and performs constant returns to scale. In order to clarify the 
properties of the matching function, one can consider the functional form commonly used in 
matching models, i.e. the Cobb-Douglas function:
6
 ( ) aa1RRR hvh,vmm −== , where 1a0 <<  
is the (constant) elasticity of the matching function with respect to the share of seekers. The 
two instantaneous probabilities that characterise the matching process can thus be 
obtained: ( ) a1R
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probability of filling a vacant house. It follows that the key variable of the model, the so-
called market tightness, θ , with { }SR,i = , can be introduced: 
h
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≡  
the ratio between vacancies and home seekers identifies the market frictions which prevent 
(or delay) the matching between the parties. Note that 
iθ , with { }SR,i = , is the housing 
market tightness from the standpoint of sellers and landlords.
7
 Hence, an increase in market 
tightness (vacant houses) causes a positive (negative) effect on the demand (supply) side 
due to the congestion externalities effect on the sellers/landlords’ side. Accordingly, the 
home-finding rate, i.e. the ratio between the matching function and the share of home 
seekers: 
( ) ( ) ( ),1θm
h
h,vm
θg R
R
R == ;  ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ),1θmhh
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θg S
S
SS
S =+
+
=  
is positive, increasing and concave in market tightness, while the vacancy-filling rate, i.e. the 
ratio between the matching function and the number of vacancies 
( ) ( ) ( )1R
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−
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 In this instance we take into account only the rental market but the same pattern applies to the 
homeownership market. 
7
 In the matching literature (see Pissarides, 2000), in fact, market tightness is usually calculated from the firm’s 
standpoint. 
 5 
is a positive, decreasing and convex function in market tightness.
8
 Intuitively, this is 
straightforward to understand since if market tightness increases (decreases), the 
probability of filling a vacant house is lower (higher), while the probability of finding a home 
is higher (lower). 
In order to study the matching between the parties in the two markets, it is 
necessary to introduce the value functions of the model. The value functions describe the 
expected marginal values (from which the positive and exogenous interest rate r has been 
deducted) associated with the differing conditions of housing market participants, basically 
comparing them to financial securities: 
9
 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]HpxθgHTθgerH SSR −−⋅+−⋅+−=                                    [1] 
( ) [ ] [ ]THδTpxθgperT SSRS −⋅+−−⋅+−−=                        [2] 
( ) [ ]RRR VDθqcrV −⋅+−=               [3] 
[ ]DVδprD RR −⋅+=                                         [4] 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]ShSSShSSS Vpβ1θqVpβθqcrV S −⋅−⋅+−⋅⋅+−=            [5] 
where H  is the discounted present value of an infinite life of a seeker (h); T  is the 
discounted present value of an infinite life of a tenant (hS); RV  is the discounted present 
value of a vacant house in the rental market; D  is the discounted present value of an infinite 
life of a landlord, and SV  is the discounted present value of a vacant house in the 
homeownership market. In the rental market, existing leases are cancelled at the exogenous 
rate δ , and thus at the rate δ  a tenant (hS) becomes a seeker (h). Instead, in the 
homeownership market if a contract is legally binding (as hypothesised) it is no longer 
possible to return to the circumstances preceding the bill of sale (unless a new and distinct 
contractual relationship is set up); hence, the discounted present value of an infinite life of a 
seller is simply given by the selling price ( Sp ). In short, the destruction rate in the rental 
market is δ > 0 (lease destruction rate), while it is zero for the sale market. The terms on the 
right hand side of the value functions are, respectively, the “dividends” associated with the 
different conditions and the “capital gains”. As regards the “dividends”, e  is the effort (in 
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 Also, standard technical assumptions are usually assumed: ( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ iθi0θ θglimθqlim ii
, and 
( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim iθi0θ ii == ∞→→ , i ∀ . 
9
 Time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the future at the exogenous 
interest rate r. It is common practice in the literature to make use of linear utility functions. Assuming that 
individuals are risk neutral not only simplifies the analysis, but also allows to focus on the consequences of the 
search and matching process rather than on the deficiencies of the insurance markets. 
 6 
monetary terms) made by the home seekers to find and visit the largest possible number of 
houses: obviously, See > , since the seeker (h) search in both markets; c  is the cost of 
opening a vacant house and in this case it also includes the cost of building new homes; 
finally, x is the buyer’s benefit  which coincides with the value of the house and depends on 
the housing characteristics.
10
 As will become clear later, x can differ from the market price 
because of the matching frictions and bargaining power. The “capital gain”, instead, is the 
transition from one condition to the other, influenced by the probability of finding a home 
( )iθg , of filling a vacancy ( )iθq , with { }SR,i = , and by the lease destruction rate δ. Consider 
equation [1], for example (the same reasoning applies for the other value functions): a 
seeker (h) bears cost flows ( he ) during the search (negative dividends); whereas, s/he 
becomes a tenant at the rate ( )Rθg , thus obtaining the value T , and gets the house and 
pays the selling price at the rate ( )Sθg . Hence, at the rates ( )Rθg  and ( )Sθg , s/he finds a 
home as tenant or as homeowner (capital gains). 
Because potential buyers are different, the selling prices are also different: in fact, 
the seller may be matched with either a tenant (hS) or a seeker (h). Hence, β  = hS / (hS + h) 
and ( )β1 −  = h / (hS + h) in equation [5] are, respectively, the share of tenants (hS) and 
seekers (h). In this model, however, the home-seekers differ only with respect to their state 
in the search process. Furthermore, they can change their condition in the house-search 
process: in fact, a seeker (h) can become a tenant (hS) and vice versa. Therefore, we assume 
that sellers are not able to distinguish between different states of buyers in the search 
process, i.e. the buyers always appear identical to sellers ex ante. Hence, also the selling 
prices appear identical to sellers ex ante, namely S
h
S
h
S ppp
S
== , and thus equation [5] 
collapses to: 
( ) [ ]SsSS VpθqcrV −⋅+−=                           [6] 
However, when the parties meet each other, the seller will observe the state of buyer ex 
post. Nevertheless, s/he always decides to sell since the search is costly in terms of time and 
money. In a nutshell, if the search is costly and random, it is not convenient for the seller to 
wait for a new match. Hence, sellers accept offers as long as the selling price is higher than 
the value of a vacant house. 
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 According to the hedonic price theory, the value of the house, and thus the buyer’s benefit, can be higher or 
lower according to the mix of desired and undesidered housing characteristics. 
 7 
Finally, the value of being a tenant T  is modelled as a staging post for searching in 
the homeownership market. Hence, a necessary condition for a non trivial equilibrium 
requires that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0θgθgδr
pee
HT
SR
RS >
+++
−−
=−  
which is true if ( ) RS pee >− , namely if the cost of being a seeker (h) in both markets is 
higher than the cost of being a tenant (hS). In this case, the tenant state is a satisfactory 
temporary situation. 
To summarise, in the value functions [1] – [6], we introduce four endogenous 
variables ( Sp , Rp , Sθ  and Rθ ), while all the other variables are exogenous. In other words, 
as is usual in matching-type models, the variables that characterise the model are market 
prices and matching frictions. Hence, once the equilibrium values of Sp , Rp , Sθ  and Rθ  are 
obtained, the value functions are determined. Precisely, the “zero profit” equilibrium 
condition or free-entry equilibrium condition, normally used by matching models (see 
Pissarides, 2000), gives the key relationship of the model between price and market 
tightness. Indeed, by using the condition 0Vi = , with { }SR,i = , in equation [3] – [4] and [6], 
we get: 
( ) ( ) ( )δrc
p
θq
1
D
θq
1 R
RR +⋅
=⇒= ( ) ( )
43421
321
r.h.s.
R
l.h.s.
1
R
δrc
p
θq
+⋅
=⇒
−
                                   [7] 
( ) ( ) c
p
θq
c
p
θq
1 S1
i
S
S
=⇒=
−
                                       [8] 
unlike the labour market matching model (which describes a negative relationship between 
market tightness and wage), in this case the free-entry condition yields a positive 
relationship between market tightness and price: in fact, ( ) 1iθq −  is increasing in iθ , with 
{ }SR,i = . This positive relationship is very intuitive: in fact, if the price increases, more 
vacancies will be on the market. However, equations [7] and [8] define a system of two 
equations in four unknowns. Thus, we need to introduce the two price equations. 
 
3. Price equations and housing market equilibrium 
We assume that market tensions are exogenous at the microeconomic level, in the sense 
that each individual takes Rθ  and Sθ  as given in the price bargaining. 
 8 
The generalised Nash bargaining solution, usually used for decentralised markets, 
allows the price to be obtained through the optimal subdivision of surplus deriving from a 
successful match. The surplus is defined as the sum of the seller/landlord’s and home-
seeker’s value when the trade takes place, net of the respective external options (the value 
of continuing to search). Hence, a trade takes place between the parties at a price 
determined by Nash bargaining if the surplus is positive. Precisely, the price (both rental and 
selling) solves the following optimisation condition: 
( ) ( ){ }γ1γ homeseeker of gain netndlord seller/laof gain netargmaxprice −⋅=                                 [9] 
where ( )1 0,γ ∈  is the bargaining power of the seller/landlord. The bargained price crucially 
depends on the surplus deriving from the matching. Precisely, in this model three kinds of 
matching can occur, thus leading to different surpluses: 
1) The seeker (h) finds a home in the homeownership market. This matching produces an 
equilibrium selling price of  ( ) ( ){ }γ1SγSS1S HpxVpargmaxp −−−⋅−= ; 
2) The tenant (hS) finds a home in the homeownership market. Hence, the equilibrium 
selling price  is ( ) ( ){ }γ1SγSS2S TpxVpargmaxp −−−⋅−= ; 
3) The seeker (h) finds a home in the rental market. This matching produces an 
equilibrium rental price of ( ) ( ){ }γ1γRRR HTVDargmaxp −−⋅−= . 
Therefore, the existence of price dispersion can be straightforwardly shown. In fact, in the 
homeownership market the net gain of seeker (h) is different from that of tenant (hS), and 
this produces two different surpluses. Eventually, from equation [9] two different selling 
prices (
1
Sp  and 
2
Sp ) are obtained. It follows that the origin of price dispersion is due to the 
different states of home seekers in the search process. Indeed, this result holds true even in 
the presence of an identical bargaining power, identical search costs and also when the 
same house (namely, the same the buyer’s benefit, x) is considered. 
As regards the selling prices, i.e. the matching 1) and 2) in the homeownership 
market, solving the optimisation conditions yields (recall that in equilibrium i 0,Vi ∀=  ): 
( ) 1S1S p
γ
γ1
Hpx ⋅
−
=−− ( )Hxγp1S −⋅=⇒  
( ) 2S2S p
γ
γ1
Tpx ⋅
−
=−− ( )Txγp2S −⋅=⇒  
 9 
Given the properties of equations [1] and [2], both 
1
Sp  and 
2
Sp  depend positively on Rp  (yet 
remaining different since HT ≠ ): in fact, an increase in the rental price reduces both T  
(directly) and H  (indirectly through T ). Therefore, without loss of generality, we can express 
this relationship in a broader form as follows:
 11
 
( )RSS ppp =                           [10] 
with 0p/p RS >∂∂ . Furthermore, if the rental price tends to zero, no one will have 
convenience to buy a house and the value of being a tenant will be at the maximum. As a 
result, the selling price will also tend to zero, since it cannot be negative or null (since the 
surplus is positive). 
Instead, as regards the matching 3) in the rental market, we obtain: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )RR VD/γγ1HT −⋅−=−  
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) RRR
R
RR pcHT
γ1
θqδrγ
θqδr
cp
γ
γ1
HT =−−⋅
−
++⋅
⇒
++
+
⋅
−
=−⇒  
We know that an increase in selling price reduces both T  and H , since both home-seekers 
search in the homeownership market. Nevertheless, as long as the tenant state is an 
appealing perspective, i.e. as long as ( ) δθg R > , the decrease in T  is stronger than the 
decrease in H , i.e. 
SS p
H
p
T
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
. Indeed, buying a home is the only future perspective for a 
tenant. Hence, in this case we obtain a negative relationship between rental price and selling 
price: 
( )SRR ppp =                           [11] 
with 0p/p SR <∂∂ . 
Therefore, the relationship between selling and rental prices can be represented in 
the diagram with axes [ Sp , Rp ], where only a steady-state equilibrium exists in the housing 
market with positive prices (see Figure 1a). 
========== Figure 1 about here now at the end ========== 
Eventually, given 
*
Rp  and 
*
Sp , we obtain a unique value of tightness for each market 
(
*
Rθ  and 
*
Sθ ) at the macroeconomic level. This testable proposition is made possible by a 
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 Alternatively, one could see pS as a function of the two selling prices (pS
1
, pS
2
) and set up a system of four 
equations in four unknowns (pS, pS
1
, pS
2
, pR). However, this solution would add complexity but no further 
insight. 
 10 
downward sloping price function which forms the right hand side (r.h.s.) of the free-entry 
conditions (see equations [7]-[8] and Figure 1b). In fact, ceteris paribus, 0θ/p RR <∂∂  and 
0θ/p SS <∂∂ , since an increase in market tightness increases T and H and reduces ( )Rθq . 
Finally, we close the model by describing the evolution of h  and Sh  in the course of 
time t :
12
 
( ) ( )[ ] hθgθgλhδ
t
h
h SRS ⋅+−+⋅=∂
∂
≡&           [12] 
( ) ( ) SSRSS hθghθg
t
h
h ⋅−⋅=
∂
∂
≡&                                                                                                        [13] 
where Shδ ⋅  represents seekers inflows, i.e. existing leases cancelled at rate δ ; 
( ) ( )[ ]SR θgθgh +⋅  describes the seekers outflows, i.e. the seekers (h) that find a home as 
tenant or as homeowner, and λ  are the “new” home seekers. Likewise, ( ) hθg R ⋅  and 
( ) SS hθg ⋅  describe, respectively, the inflows and outflows in/from the tenant state. 
In steady state equilibrium, where h  and Sh  are constant over time, it follows that: 
⇒= 0h& ( ) ( )[ ] hθgθgλhδ SRS ⋅+=+⋅  
⇒= 0hS
& ( ) ( ) SSR hθghθg ⋅=⋅  
therefore, given the value of search frictions in both markets, we get a system of two 
equations in two unknowns: h  and Sh . Sufficient condition for the existence of an interior 
equilibrium is that ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) δθg
θgθg
θg
R
SR
S >
+
⋅ , namely ( )Sθg  is sufficiently high or δ  is 
sufficiently low:  
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) SR
S
SR hδ
θg
θg
θgθgλ ⋅






−⋅+=            [14] 
( )
( ) SR
S h
θg
θg
h ⋅=               [15] 
In words, if the probability of finding a home in the sale market is sufficiently high 
and/or the lease destruction rate is sufficiently low, the perspective of finding a home in 
both markets is very attractive. This is consistent with the story told in this model, where the 
goal of each home seeker is to buy a house and the tenant state is a satisfactory temporary 
situation. 
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 The equilibrium usually characterised by these models is in fact the stationary state, in which the values of 
the variables are not subject to further changes over time. 
 11 
4. Effects of taxation on house prices 
By considering rental and homeownership market together in a matching framework, one 
can study how changes in the relative tax treatment of owner and rental housing influence 
the two markets. Indeed, the proposed theoretical model can be used to show the effects of 
both property sale tax and rental income tax. 
Basically, from a microeconomic point of view, the taxation (τ ) increases the house 
prices, since the sellers/landlords with a sufficient bargaining power react by increasing the 
price charged to the home-seekers. This can be straightforwardly shown by introducing the 
term iτ− , with { }SR,i = , in the value of an occupied home, viz.:13 
[ ]DVδτprD RRR −⋅+−=             [16] 
( ) [ ]SSsSS VτpθqcrV −−⋅+−=                                                                                                         [17] 
Precisely, by using equations [10] and [11] together, it is possible to show that a tax on 
property sale ( Sτ ) leads to an increase in selling price and a decrease in rental price (see also 
figure 2a); whereas, a tax on rental income ( Rτ ) leads to an increase in both selling and 
rental prices (see also figure 2b). 
========== Figure 2 about here now at the end ========== 
The change in house prices, in turn, affects the time it takes to sell (to rent) a 
property, the so-called time-on-the-market (TOM), which measures the degree of illiquidity 
of the real estate market. By using the free-entry conditions, it is straightforward to show 
that the house with a higher price has a longer time-on-the-market. In fact, with a 
probability of filling a vacant house of ( )iθq , the (expected) time-on-the-market is ( ) 1iθq −  
which is increasing in iθ , with { }SR,i = . As a result, with a tax on rental income the time-on-
the-market increases for both markets (since both prices are higher); whereas, with a tax on 
property sale the time-on-the-market increases in the homeownership market but decreases 
in the rental market. Thus, a property sale tax may be better than a rental income tax. The 
explanation is that the tax on property sale is a lump-sum cost for sellers, while the tax on 
rental income is a cost flow for landlords. 
Nevertheless, the model’s prediction that levying rental income tax will increase 
house price might seem very counter-intuitive. In particular, it is inconsistent with the 
classical four-quadrant model (see DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1992, 1996). However, in this 
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simple model there is the distinction between sellers and landlords. By introducing the 
possibility that the sellers can rent their house and landlords can sell their house, the rental 
income tax Rτ  introduces a further effect into the model developed here. Precisely, an 
increase in Rτ  reduces the value of being a landlord ( D ). Hence, many landlords may choose 
to sell their house rather than to offer rental units, thus increasing vacant houses and 
market frictions in the sale market. This, in turn, has a negative effect on the house price, 
since Sp  depends negatively on Sθ  (due to the congestion externalities effect on the sellers’ 
side). An analogous reasoning applies to the tax on property sale ( Sτ ). Therefore, it can be 
useful to develop in the future an extended version of the model in order to investigate the 
net effect of taxation on house prices. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we develop a matching theoretic-model that is able to capture the main 
characteristic of the housing market, namely the house price dispersion, and considers the 
rental and homeownership market together. Precisely, this housing market matching model 
considers two types of home seekers: people who search for a house both in the rental and 
in the homeownership market, and people who only search in the homeownership market. 
The house-search process leads to several types of matching and in turn this implies 
different prices of equilibrium. Also, the house-search process connects the rental market 
with the homeownership market. This paper is thus able to explain both the price dispersion 
and the relationship between rental and selling prices, relying only on the different states of 
home-seekers in the search and matching process. Also, this theoretical model can be useful 
to study the effects of taxation in the housing market. 
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Figures 
 
a) microeconomic (house prices) 
 
 
b) macroeconomic (housing market tightness) 
Figure 1. Equilibrium 
 
 
 
a) tax on property sale 
 
b) tax on rental income 
Figure 2. Effects of taxation 
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